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Abstract The paper contains a description of a new approach (called the SF+AS
method, i.e. the scenario forecasting+alternative selection method) that can be used
in decision making under uncertainty when pure optimal strategies are sought-after.
This procedure takes into consideration the level of decision maker’s coefficient of
optimism (or coefficient of pessimism) and consists of two stages: the true scenario
forecasting (on the basis of the decision maker’s preferences) and the appropriate
alternative selection by taking into account the payoffs of the appointed true scenario or
the most probable scenarios. In contradiction to existing decision rules, this procedure
assumes that the decision making process should involve only a part of the payoff
matrix because only one state of nature will occur in the end. The second essential
difference between the SF+AS method and other decision rules is that in the first one
there is an attempt to appoint globally the best and the worst scenario (regardless the
alternative considered). Meanwhile, other procedures determine the status of a given
event depending on the decision.
Keywords Decision making · Uncertainty · Pure strategy · True scenario
forecasting · Coefficient of optimism · Coefficient of pessimism
1 Introduction
In most cases we are not able to anticipate the future effectively, which means that we
make our decisions (i.e. choose the appropriate alternative) under uncertainty or under
risk. Possible scenarios (states of nature) are predicted by experts or by the decision
maker (DM).Decisionmakingunder uncertainty (DMUU)occurswhen theprobability
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Table 1 Payoff matrix (general
case)
Scenarios and decisions D1 Dj Dn
S1 a11 a1 j a1n
Si ai1 ai j ain
Sm am1 amj amn
of those states of nature is not known orwhen the decisionmaker does notwant tomake
use of the estimated probability distribution. If the likelihood of particular scenarios is
known and significant for the decisionmaker, thenwe deal with decisionmaking under
risk (DMUR) (Chronopoulos et al. 2011; Groenewald and Pretorius 2011; Haimann
et al. 1985; Knight 1921; Render et al. 2006; Trzaskalik 2008). These two categories
(uncertainty and risk) were formally integrated in economic theory by von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944). It is worth mentioning that there is also a third category,
decisionmakingwith partial (incomplete) information (DMPI), which is characterized
by probability distributions not known completely (Cannon and Kmietowicz 1974;
Kmietowicz and Pearman 1984; Kofler 1993; Michalska 2014; Weber 1987). In this
contribution we will focus on DMUU which seems to be more frequent in realistic
decision problems (Xiaogang and Rongwei 2012). The result of the choice made by
the decision maker under uncertainty depends on two factors: which decision will be
selected (internal factor) and which scenario will occur in the future (external factor).
In contradiction to n-person games (where players are conscious adversaries), within
games against nature the last one plays a passive role and is a neutral opponent (Luce
and Raiffa 1957; Officer and Anderson 1968). DMUU may be presented with the aid
of a profit or payoff matrix (Table 1) where m is the number of mutually exclusive
scenarios (let us denote them by S1, S2, . . . , Sm), n signifies the number of decisions
(D1, D2, . . . , Dn) and ai j is the profit connected with scenario Si and alternative Dj .
The goal of the DM consists in selecting the decision which maximizes the profit.
Note that in order to avoid too many repetitions, we will use the following notions
as synonyms:
– “scenarios” = “states of nature” = “events”,
– “decisions” = “alternatives”.
Sometimes the distribution of payoffs connected with particular alternatives is not
discrete and then the profits for each decision Dj belong to an interval [w j ,m j ]
(Branzei et al. 2011; Gaspars-Wieloch 2013a, 2014b; Huynh et al. 2009). In this
paper we will focus on the scenario approach for DMUU which has a lower degree of
uncertainty than the interval approach because only several outcomes from this range
may occur.
In the uncertainty case the decision maker may search an optimal pure strategy or
an optimal mixed strategy. A pure strategy is a solution assuming that the decision
maker chooses and completely executes one and only one alternative. Meanwhile
the mixed strategy (mixed acts, mixed actions) allows the decision maker to select
and perform a weighted combination of several accessible alternatives, see e.g. bonds
portfolio construction, cultivation of different plants (Gaspars-Wieloch 2014a; Officer
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and Anderson 1968; Puppe and Schlag 2009; Sikora 2008). The whole paper will
concern the optimal pure strategy searching.
We will also assume that each alternative is characterized by one criterion value
or by one synthetic aggregated value denoting the overall realization of all significant
criteria.
The literature offers many procedures applied to DMUU, such as the Wald’s cri-
terion (Wald 1950a, b), the maximax criterion described for example in Pazek and
Rozman (2009), the maximin joy criterion (Hayashi 2006; Puppe and Schlag 2009);
the Hurwicz’s criterion (Hurwicz 1951, 1952), the Savage’s criterion (Savage 1961;
Niehans 1948), the Bayes’ (Laplace’s) criterion or equality decision criterion (see
e.g. Render et al. 2006), which, for convenience, can be called “the classical decision
rules”—CD rules (see also Xiaogang and Rongwei 2012), and many diverse exten-
sions or hybrids of these methods (see e.g. Basili 2006; Basili et al. 2008; Basili and
Chateauneuf 2011; Basili and Zappia 2010; Chateauneuf and Cohen 2000; Ellsberg
2001; Etner et al. 2012;Gaspars-Wieloch 2013a, 2014b;Ghirardato et al. 2004;Gilboa
2009; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989; Ioan and Ioan 2011; Karni 1985; Karni et al. 1983;
Marinacci 2002; Nakamura 1986; Officer and Anderson 1968; Piasecki 1990; Tversky
and Kahneman 1992), which can be named “the extended decisions rules”—ED rules.
In all of them a measure (e.g. the Wald’s criterion, the Ellsberg index, the α-
MEU index, etc.) precisely defined is computed for each alternative, which allows the
decision maker to choose in the last step the decision with the most preferable value of
the applied index. This measure depends on one, two, several or all payoffs connected
with particular decisions.
In the majority of existing methods the alternative is selected on the basis of the
level of optimism or the level of risk aversion declared by the decision maker. Please,
note that when talking about DM’s risk aversion, we do not treat risk as a situation
where the probability distribution of each parameter of the decision problem is known,
but we mean a danger of incurring losses or a danger of low outcomes occurring, i.e.
the possibility that some unfavourable circumstances will happen.
When the decision maker is adventurous, it is recommended to look at the high-
est payoffs assigned to each decision and to choose the alternative according to the
maximax rule (optimism decision criterion). When the DM represents a risk-averse
behavior, it is suggested to compare the lowest profits or the highest regrets and to
follow the Wald’s rule, the maximin joy criterion or the Savage’s rule. Finally, when
we deal with a moderate DM, the Hurwicz’s approach, also called compromised deci-
sion criterion, (or diverse extended decision rules) can be used since it enables one
to assign a coefficient of pessimism (α) to the worst value and a coefficient of opti-
mism (β = 1 − α) to the best outcome connected with particular strategies in order
to obtain a weighted average for each alternative and select a suitable decision. Let
us add that both coefficients fulfill the following conditions: α ∈ [0, 1], β ∈ [0, 1].
They are undoubtedly very subjective, because they are determined by people rep-
resenting varied attitudes towards future, risk, investments etc. Parameter β is close
to 1 for extreme optimists, i.e. adventurous decision makers expecting high payoffs
(risk-prone behavior), and it tends to 0 for radical pessimists, i.e. cautious decision





Scenarios and decisions D1 D2 D3
S1 5 4 3 (min)
S2 10 (max) 1 (min) 7 (max)
S3 0 (min) 8 (max) 5
It is worth emphasizing that usually the highest and the lowest profit of particular
decisions come fromdifferent states of nature. Thatmeans that a given scenariomay be
very optimistic from the point of view of one decision and simultaneously–extremely
bad with respect to an other alternative (see Table 2, scenarios S2 and S3). Hence,
according to the nature of existing methods, scenarios are very seldom considered as
totally pessimistic or totally optimistic. Meanwhile, Officer and Anderson (1968) and
Milnor (1954) state that each decision rule theoretically destined for games against
nature,which treats nature as a conscious opponentwho is altering strategies depending
on the outcomes, is wrong and unsatisfactory!
Therefore, let us think over the following new question—is it possible to forecast
the true state of nature on the basis of the decision maker’s coefficient of optimism
and to select the appropriate alternative by taking into account not the whole payoff
matrix (i.e. the whole set of possible scenarios) but only the scenario (or scenarios)
meeting (or nearly meeting) the DM’s preferences?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 the author suggests and
describes a new method enabling one to forecast the true state of nature depending
on the decision maker’s attitude towards risk and to select in the second stage the
appropriate alternative. In Sect. 3 the Reader will find a case study. Conclusions are
gathered in Sect. 4.
2 The SF + AS method: description and illustration
Themethod presented below (called the SF+ASmethod, i.e. scenario forecasting and
alternative selection method) has been already described in Gaspars-Wieloch (2013b),
but in this contribution the description is more formal, extensive and comprehensive.
SF+AS appeals to a totally different concept than other procedures do. This time
a given scenario will be treated as extremely pessimistic, moderately pessimistic,
moderate, moderately optimistic or radically optimistic irrespective of the alternative.
Hence, the heart of the problem consists in applying a suitable tool enabling one
to determine correctly the status of each state of nature. This is the first stage of the
SF+AS method. Possible techniques can be diverse—here, we will use the concept
of dominance and the coefficient of optimism declared by the decision maker. After
generating a ranking of scenarios by means of the sum of “dominance cases”, an
interval of values of the coefficient of optimism will be assigned to each state of
nature. Obviously, higher the sum of “dominance cases” for a given scenario is, more
optimistic this scenario should be.
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The second stage of the SF+AS method concerns the choice of an appropriate
decision on the basis of the scenario (scenarios) corresponding to the decision maker’s
risk aversion.
Let us enumerate the steps of the whole procedure in the general case:
1. Calculate the sum of the “dominance cases” for each scenario (Eqs. 1 and 2).
di j = m − max
{
p j (ai j )
}




di j i = 1, . . . ,m (2)
where di j denotes the number of payoffs related to alternative Dj which are worse
than payoff ai j . Symbolm still signifies the number of scenarios and p j (ai j ) is the
position of payoff ai j in the non-increasing sequence of all profits connected with
decision Dj (when ai j has the same value than at least one other payoff concerning
a given alternative, then it is recommended to choose the farthest position of this
value in the sequence—see Eq. 1). di stands for the total number of “dominance
cases” related to state Si .
2. Assign an interval for the coefficient of optimism to each scenario (Eqs. 3–5).
The width of the range (w) for each state of nature may be defined in the following
way:
w = 1
dmax − dmin + 1 (3)
where dmax and dmin are the highest and the lowest number of “dominance cases”
respectively. Such an approach allows to fit the width of the intervals to the differ-
ence between the highest and the lowest number of “dominance cases”.
The extremevalues (bi and ti ) of a given interval, i.e. its endpoints, can be computed










∧(b ∈ [0; 1−w])
}}








t ≥ di − dmin
dmax − dmin
)
∧ (t ∈ [w; 1]) ∧ (t = bi + w)
}}
i = 1, . . . ,m (5)
Additionally, let us assume that, apart from the interval(s) for the lowest number
of “dominance cases”, the intervals are left-open.
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a. If parameterβk (i.e. the coefficient of optimismofDM k) belongs to the interval
assigned to exactly one scenario, then that set contains all payoffs connected
with this state of nature:
∃!
i
(βk ∈ [bi , ti ] ∨ βk ∈]bi , ti ]) ⇒ V (k) =
{
ai1, ai2, . . . , ai j , . . . , ain
}
(7)
b. If βk belongs to the interval assigned to more than one scenario, generate the
set of values using Eqs. (8–9).
∃
i










ai j j = 1, . . . , n (9)
where S(Ski ) is the set containing scenarios Si with an interval covering para-
meter βk and |S(Ski )| denotes the cardinality of this set. |S(Ski )| stands for the
number of scenarios significant for decision maker k.
c. If βk does not belong to any interval assigned to scenarios, compute the set of
values using Eqs. (10–11).
¬∃
i





Aweig(e, f )j,k =
βk − te
b f − te · a f j +
b f − βk
b f − te · aej j = 1, . . . , n (11)
where parameters e and f concern the scenarios which values of β are a little
lower (Eq. 12) and a little higher (Eq. 13) than parameter βk . Parameters te and
b f signify the right endpoint of interval e and the left endpoint of interval f ,
respectively. Finally, aej and a f j constitute the payoffs connectedwith decision
Dj and scenarios Se and S f .
S(Se) = {Si | ((βk − ti > 0) ∧ (βk − ti → min))} (12)
S(S f ) = {Si | ((bi − βk > 0) ∧ (bi − βk → min))} (13)
where S(Se) and S(S f ) are sets containing scenarios Se and S f , respectively.
Note that if there aremore than one state Se or S f (because of the occurrence of
the same interval), then instead of aej or a f j , an arithmetic average of suitable
payoffs is taken into consideration (Eqs. 14–15):
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(∣∣S(S f )





where |S(Se)| and |S(S f )| denote the cardinalities of sets S(Se) and S(S f ).
4. a. Find alternative Dkj (1) which has the highest value in set V(k) computed in step
3:





b. If decision Dkj (1) fulfils condition (17), it is the optimal one (D
k
j (1) = Dk∗j ).
∀
t∈{1,2,...,pk }
(at, j (1) ≥ w∗j ) (17)
pk = (1 − βk) · m = αk · m (18)
a1, j (1) ≥ a2, j (1) ≥ · · · ≥ at, j (1) ≥ · · · ≥ apk−1, j (1) ≥ apk , j (1) (19)
where pk is the minimal number of scenarios whose payoffs should be at least
equal to w∗j , at, j (1) fulfills Eq. (19) and stands for the outcome connected
with decision Dkj (1) and scenario St . Symbol w
∗
j denotes the Wald’s measure
obtained for the optimal alternative according to the Wald’s rule (see Eqs. 20–
21):











If there are more than one decision fulfilling Eq. (16), only those which satisfy
condition (17) are optimal.
c. If decision Dkj (1) does not satisfy Eq. (17), then find alternative D
k
j (2) fulfilling









(at, j ≥ w∗j )
)
(22)
As we see, the last step of the SF+AS method provides a kind of security for
pessimists and moderate decision makers. Lower the coefficient of optimism is, more
certain is that the decision maker will not gain less than w∗j .
3 Case study
Let us analyze the following example. Table 3 presents a payoff matrix. Profits are






P1 P2 P3 P4
S1 1 2 7 7
S2 5 4 1 6
S3 6 6 8 5
S4 10 3 9 5
Table 4 Binary relation R1 (according to P1)
Scenarios Scenarios
S1 S2 S3 S4
S1 0 0 0 0
S2 1 0 0 0
S3 1 1 0 0
S4 1 1 1 0
Su is better than Sw , if according to alternative P1, au1 > aw1.
Hence: ∀Su , Sw ∈ S(Si ) : R1(Su , Sw) ⇔ au1 > aw1.
S(Si ) is the set of scenarios Si . Notation R1(Su , Sw) signifies that Su is R1-related to Sw . When Su is
R1-related to Sw , then the bolean-valued function of relation R1 is equal to 1. Otherwise, this function
equals 0.
∀Su , Sw ∈ S(Si ) : fR1 (S(Si )) = 1 ⇔ R1(Su , Sw)∀Su , Sw ∈ S(Si ) : fR1 (S(Si )) = 0 ⇔ ¬R1(Su , Sw)
For instance, S1 is not R1-related to S2 because a11 = 1 < a21 = 5. Thus, for pair (S1, S2) function
fR1 (S(Si )) = 0. However, for pair (S2, S1) function fR1 (S(Si )) = 1, since S2 is R1-related to S1(a21 =
5 > a11 = 1)
(DM1, DM2, DM3, DM4). They dispose of four possible strategies (projects P1, P2,
P3, P4) and they are aware of the fact that one out of four states of nature (S1, S2,
S3, S4) will occur in the future, but they have no information about the likelihood of
particular scenarios. Each decision maker has a different attitude towards risk. The
first one is a pessimist, his coefficient of optimism equals β1 = 0.1, the second one
is a moderate pessimist (β2 = 0.4), the third one is a moderate optimist (β3 = 0.65)
and the last one is a radical optimist (β4 = 0.95). This situation may signify that
each decision maker has a totally unlike opinion about the true state of nature, i.e. the
scenario that will really happen.
According to the concept of Pareto optimality (Ehrgott 2005) no scenario from
Table 3 is dominated by other scenarios (Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). All of them are Pareto
optimal, since each column of Table 8 (representing themulticriteria comparison being
the product of all binary relations) contains only zeros.
But even if all scenarios are Pareto optimal, one can observe that states S1 and S2
usually offerworse results than states S3 andS4do.Therefore,wedetect a possibility to
work out a ranking of the considered states (see the first step of SF+AS). Theoretically,
there are many procedures allowing to generate this ranking. For instance, one can use
the criterion of the sum of payoffs for each scenario (17, 16, 25 and 27, respectively),
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Table 5 Binary relation R2
(according to P2)
Su is better than Sw , if
according to alternative P2,
au2 > aw2. Hence: ∀Su , Sw ∈
S(Si ) : Su R2Sw ⇔ au2 > aw2
Scenarios Scenarios
S1 S2 S3 S4
S1 0 0 0 0
S2 1 0 0 1
S3 1 1 0 1
S4 1 0 0 0
Table 6 Binary relation R3
(according to P3)
Su is better than Sw , if
according to alternative P3,
au3 > aw3. Hence: ∀Su , Sw ∈
S(Si ) : Su R3Sw ⇔ au3 > aw3
Scenarios Scenarios
S1 S2 S3 S4
S1 0 1 0 0
S2 0 0 0 0
S3 1 1 0 0
S4 1 1 1 0
Table 7 Binary relation R4
(according to P4)
Su is better than Sw , if
according to alternative P4,
au4 > aw4. Hence: ∀Su , Sw ∈
S(Si ) : Su R4Sw ⇔ au4 > aw4)
Scenarios Scenarios
S1 S2 S3 S4
S1 0 1 1 1
S2 0 0 1 1
S3 0 0 0 0
S4 0 0 0 0
Table 8 Multicriteria
comparison W [R1, R2, R3, R4],
i.e. the product of all binary
relations (Su dominates Sw , if
for all decisions Pj , Su is better
than Sw)
Scenarios Scenarios
S1 S2 S3 S4
S1 0 0 0 0
S2 0 0 0 0
S3 0 0 0 0
S4 0 0 0 0
the criterion of the sum of regrets (this time, the regrets would be calculated in relation
to the best outcome connected with a given alternative, compare with the Savage’s
rule and see Table 9) or the criterion of the sum of utility functions/performance
measures/implementation degrees (Gaspars-Wieloch 2012; Kukula 2000). Here we
will apply the sum of “dominance cases” for each alternative (Table 10, e.g. scenario
S1 is 4 times better than other events since for P3: S1  S2, for P4: S1  S2, S1  S3
and S1  S4).
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Table 9 Regrets computed in
relation to the best outcome for
particular alternatives—Example
II
Scenarios Alternatives Sum of regrets
P1 P2 P3 P4
S1 9 4 2 0 15
S2 5 2 8 1 16
S3 4 0 1 2 7
S4 0 3 0 2 5
Table 10 Payoff matrix, sums
of “dominance cases” and
intervals for β—Example II
Scenarios Alternatives Sum of “dominance
cases” (di )
Interval for β
P1 P2 P3 P4
S1 1 2 7 7 4 [0.00, 0.25]
S2 5 4 1 6 5 ]0.25, 0.50]
S3 6 6 8 5 7 ]0.75,1.00]
S4 10 3 9 5 7 ]0.75,1.00]
Now, having a ranking of states of nature (I place: S3 and S4, II place: S2, III
place: S1), one may attempt to assign a suitable interval of values of the coefficient of
optimism to each scenario (see the second step of SF+AS and Eqs. 3–5):
w = 1







b ≤ 4 − 4
7 − 4
)









t ≥ 4 − 4
7 − 4
)









b ≤ 5 − 4
7 − 4
)









t ≥ 5 − 4
7 − 4
)
∧ (t ∈ [0.25; 1]) ∧ (t = 0.25 + 0.25)
}}
= 0.50,






b ≤ 7 − 4
7 − 4
)










t ≥ 7 − 4
7 − 4
)
∧ (t ∈ [0.25; 1]) ∧ (t = 0.75 + 0.25)
}}
= 1.00.
One can observe two facts on the basis of the ranges set in Table 10:
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– more than one state of nature may contain the same interval (see scenarios S3 and
S4),
– intervals do not have to cover the whole range of possible values for parameter β
(values greater than 0.5 and not exceeding 0.75 do not occur in our case).
According to the risk aversion declared by the decision makers, state S1 may be the
true state in DM1’s opinion (β1 = 0.1 ∈ [0.00, 0.25]) and S2 may be selected by
DM2 as the true scenario (β2 = 0.4 ∈]0.25, 0.50]). There are two states (S3 and
S4) which correspond to the DM4’s level of optimism (β4 = 0.95 ∈]0.75, 1.00])
and there is no scenario which can be directly assigned to the DM3’s preferences
(β3 = 0.65 /∈ [0.00, 0.25], β3 /∈]0.25, 0.50], β3 /∈]0.75, 1.00]). Therefore, it is
recommended, in the DM4’s case, to use for each decision an arithmetic average of the
payoffs related to both states S3 and S4 (see Eqs. 8–9). On the other hand, for DM3
it is suggested to calculate a weighted average of outcomes related to the “nearest”
scenarios i.e. S3, S4 and S2 following Eqs. (10–15).
Now, we can perform the second stage of the SF+AS method which consists in
selecting the appropriate alternative (see the third and the fourth step of SF+AS):
a. DM1 makes his choice on the basis of the payoffs that can occur if scenario S1









= {a11, a12, a13, a14} = {1, 2, 7, 7} ,





Hence D1j (1) = P3 = P4. Let us compute p1 and w∗j according to Eqs. (18), (20),
(21) and check whether both projects satisfy Eq. (17):
p1 = (1 − β1) · m = (1 − 0.1) · 4 = 0.9 · 4 = 3.6 = 4,
w1 = min {1, 5, 6, 10} = 1, w2 = 2, w3 = 1, w4 = 5,
w∗j = max {1, 2, 1, 5} = 5.
Thus, all payoffs (p1 equals 4) connected with P3 and P4 should be at least equal
to w∗j = 5.
I. For P3: a1,3 = 9 ≥ 5, a2,3 = 8 ≥ 5, ap1−1,3 = a3,3 = 7 ≥ 5, but ap1,3 =
a4,3 = 1 < 5.
II. For P4: a1,4 = 7 ≥ 5, a2,4 = 6 ≥ 5, ap1−1,4 = a3,4 = 5 ≥ 5, ap1,4 = a4,4 =
5 ≥ 5.
Hence: P3 = D1j (1) = D1∗j and P4 = D1j (1) = D1∗j . DM4 should select project
P4.










= {a21, a22, a23, a24} = {5, 4, 1, 6},







Thus, he or she should choose project P4 (D2j (1) = P4). This time, p2 equals 3:
p2 = (1 − β2) · m = (1 − 0.4) · 4 = 0.6 · 4 = 2.4 = 3.
Let us check whether at least 3 payoffs related to P4 are greater or equal to 5:
a1,4 = 7 ≥ 5, ap2−1,4 = a2,4 = 6 ≥ 5, ap2,4 = a3,4 = 5 ≥ 5.
P4 fulfils assumption (17), so P4 = D2j (1) = D2∗j .
c. DM4 disposes of four arithmetic averages calculated by means of Eq. (9) and the




(6 + 10) = 8.0, Aarit2,4 =
1
2




(8 + 9) = 8.5, Aarit4,4 =
1
2





= {8.0, 4.5, 8.5, 5.0},





The results indicate that DM4 ought to be interested in project P3. This time, p4
equals 1:
p4 = (1 − β4) · m = (1 − 0.95) · 4 = 0.05 · 4 = 0.2 = 1.
Let us check whether at least 1 payoff related to P3 is greater or equal to 5:
a1,3 = ap4,3 = 9 ≥ 5.
P3 fulfils assumption (17), so P3 = D4j (1) = D4∗j .
d. DM3 has to analyze the figures obtained after using Eqs. (11), (13), (15) and the
data concerning scenarios S2, S3 and S4:
Aweig(2,3+4)1,3 =
0.65 − 0.5
0.75 − 0.5 · 8 +
0.75 − 0.65
0.75 − 0.5 · 5 = 6.8,
Aweig(2,3+4)2,3 =
0.65 − 0.5
0.75 − 0.5 · 4.5 +
0.75 − 0.65
0.75 − 0.5 · 4 = 4.3,
Aweig(2,3+4)3,3 =
0.65 − 0.5
0.75 − 0.5 · 8.5 +
0.75 − 0.65
0.75 − 0.5 · 1 = 5.5,
Aweig(2,3+4)4,3 =
0.65 − 0.5
0.75 − 0.5 · 5 +
0.75 − 0.65
0.75 − 0.5 · 6 = 5.4.
123
Decision maker’s coefficient of optimism 591





= {6.8, 4.3, 5.5, 5.4},





Parameter p3 equals 2:
p3 = (1 − β3) · m = (1 − 0.65) · 4 = 0.35 · 4 = 1.4 = 2
Let us check whether at least 2 payoffs related to P1 are greater or equal to 5:
a1,1 = 10 ≥ 5, ap3,1 = a2,1 = 6 ≥ 5
P1 fulfils assumption (17), so P1 = D3j (1) = D3∗j .
Notice that if the original Hurwicz’s rule was used for the levels of βk aforemen-
tioned, the following projects would be suggested: P4 for DM1 and DM2, P1 for DM3
and DM4.
4 Conclusions
The new approach presented in the paper and called the SF+AS method can be used
in decision making under uncertainty when pure optimal alternatives are sought-after.
The procedure is designed for decision makers who are able to declare their coefficient
of optimism (pessimism). In contradiction to existing decision rules, this method con-
tains an additional stage that precedes the searching of the optimal alternative and con-
sists in forecasting the true state of nature on the basis of the DM’s risk aversion. Such
an approach signifies that the decisionmakermakes his or her choice by taking into con-
sideration only the payoffs of the forecasted true scenario or the most probable (in his
or her opinion) scenarios appointed in the first stage, and not the whole payoff matrix.
Note that successful attempts to forecast the true scenario have been already made
for example by Guo (2011, 2013, 2014), but in that case the proposed procedures are
rather designed for DMPI and, furthermore, the most probable state of nature is set for
each alternative separately (on the basis of some possibility degrees and satisfaction
levels), which means that each decision may contain a different true scenario. In our
contribution we were trying to find a global true scenario (i.e. the same one for all
alternatives).
Hence, in this procedure the status (pessimistic, moderate or optimistic) of a given
state of nature does not vary depending on the alternative, but is fixed for all decisions.
Such a way of reasoning may be a good answer to the critical analysis of decision
rules carried out by Officer and Anderson (1968) who claim that the nature is not a
conscious opponent and it cannot change the “strategy” (i.e. the scenario) to minimize
ormaximize, for each choice of the decisionmaker’s, his or her outcome. Additionally,
the use of the DM’s coefficient of optimism as a tool to forecast the true scenario has
some common features with their opinion that:
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Table 11 Payoff matrix, sums of “dominance cases” and intervals for β—Example III
Scenarios Alternatives Sum of “dominance
cases” (di )
Interval for β
P1 P2 P3 P4
S1 5 2 7 7 5 ]2/6, 3/6]
S2 1 11 1 4 3 [0, 1/6]
S3 6 6 8 5 7 ]4/6, 5/6]
S4 10 3 9 5 8 ]5/6, 1]
– uncertain decision problems for which it is not possible to estimate subjective
probabilities do not exist,
– each uncertain decision problem (i.e. for which the objective likelihood is not
known) may be reduced to a decision under risk.
Here, we do not define any subjective probabilities, however we try to find, in a
subjective way, the most probable scenario, which is characteristic of DMUR.
Note that in some specific cases for a radical optimist the SF+AS method may
lead to another solution than the maximax criterion does. If the highest outcome
occurs for a scenario with di < dmax , then suggestions given by both procedures
may be different. According to the data and calculations concerning example III
(Table 11), a radical optimist (β = 1) should choose project P2 if he or she fol-
lows the maximax decision rule, but the SF+AS method recommends project P1.
This discrepancy is a result of the fact that the maximax rule evaluates a given sce-
nario depending on payoffs related to a particular decision—S4 is the most opti-
mistic state of nature provided that projects P1 or P3 are selected, S2 is the best
on condition that P2 is executed and S1 is the most advantageous if P4 is chosen.
Hence, in this case, the status of the event is conditionally determined. Meanwhile,
the SF+AS method appoints the most favourable scenario in a global way, which
may signify that for a particular decision this state of nature does not offer the highest
outcome.
A similar phenomenon will not happen for a radical pessimist (β = 0) due to
Eqs. (17) and (22). In our example (Table 11) the Wald’s criterion indicates project
P4 and the SF+AS method suggests project P4 as well: Dj (1) = P2, but Dj (1) = D∗j ,
because pk = 4, w∗j = 4 and two payoffs connected with P2 (i.e. 2 and 3) are lower
than w∗j (see Eq. 17). P4 is project fulfilling Eq. (22): a1,4 = 7 ≥ 4, a2,4 = 5 ≥




= max{1, 1, 4} = 4.
In the description of the new approach it was recommended to establish the status
of particular scenarios using the coefficient of optimism, but, of course, this step
may be performed by appointing to each parameter di an interval for the coefficient
of pessimism since both indices (β and α) are interdependent and their sum always
equals 1.
As it wasmentioned in previous sections, the SF+ASmethod does not impose us to
forecast the true event by means of the sum of “dominance cases”. The decision maker
may apply another technique as well. He or she might use a different criterion or even
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perform a multicriteria analysis. Anyway, the sense of this procedure is to select the
most probable scenario(s) by taking decision maker’s preferences into consideration
and then to choose the appropriate alternative on the basis of a reduced payoff matrix.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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